Central bank bashing: The case of the European Central Bank by Philipp Maier & Saskia Bezoen
Central bank bashing: The case of the European Central Bank
Philipp Maier and Saskia Bezoen
*
Abstract: Central banks do not operate in a vacuum. In this paper we analyse the fac-
tors leading to external pressure or public support for European monetary policy.
Moreover, based upon the findings for the Deutsche Bundesbank, some additional les-
sons are drawn for the ECB. External pressure on the ECB mainly stems from politi-
cians or from international organisations (such as the IMF). In contrast with evidence
for the Bundesbank, interest groups (such as commercial banks) hardly try to influ-
ence European monetary policy. German data show that factors leading to external
pressure on the central bank are rising unemployment and the threat for governments
to lose their majority in the next election. This latter source of pressure is, however,
likely to be of minor importance for the ECB.
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“I hear, but I do not listen.”
W. F. Duisenberg, President of the European Central Bank
1
1  Introduction
The relationship between central banks and governments is notoriously difficult. Although central banks
increasingly are made independent, governments in many countries attempt to influence monetary policy
decisions. For instance, the former German minister of Finance, Oskar Lafontaine, called for lower Euro-
pean interest rates in 1998 and 1999. Although there is a vast literature investigating the impact of external
(political) pressure on monetary policy, little is known about its sources and causes.
Following the Collins English Dictionary, bashing refers to strong, public and often unfair criticism used
in journalism, showing disapproval. In this paper, pressure on central banks will be called central bank
bashing. The question we are most interested in is when, why and by who are central banks bashed? In-
tuitively, if inflation or unemployment is high, politicians might start bashing a central bank. Still, for
most countries a clear econometric relationship between external pressure and monetary policy does not
show up. One reason for this could be that measuring pressure is tricky, and simple proxies for pressure
(e.g. elections) do not capture the true relationship between the central bank and the outside world.
In what follows we use the methodology of Havrilesky (1993) to study external influence on European
monetary policy. He examined newspaper evidence to construct a conflict indicator for the US; we use
international newspapers to construct indicators for external pressure and for public support for European
monetary policy. Using these indicators, we examine why, by whom and when external pressure on and
public support for the ECB arises. To do so, the paper is organised as follows. In the next section, we ex-
plain the two main factors determining monetary policy. In section 3, we present the Havrilesky-
methodology and examine the aggregated pressure and support-indicators for the ECB and its “role
model”, the Bundesbank. In section 4, we check which groups have exerted pressure or offered public
support. Moreover, we assess to what extent pressure and support can be related to the national economic
situation. Next, we check in section 5 to what extent we can relate external pressure to other economic or
political variables. The final section summarises our main findings.
2  Determinants of monetary policy
The public choice literature emphasises the possibility that non-economic factors might influence mone-
tary policy. Monetary policy is directed towards achieving a goal, e.g. price stability. The pursuit of this
                                                     
1 During the press conference after the meeting of the Governing Council of the ECB on April 11, 2001.3
goal entails analysing a set of information with respect to the state of the economy. However, this is not to
say that the relevant monetary policy information is entirely determined by economic factors. Indeed,
given that the main instrument of monetary policy is a (short-term) interest rate, which is intended to in-
fluence market interest rates, expectations play a role. These expectations, however, are partly determined
by non-economic factors. For instance it has been claimed that elections (Nordhaus 1975), the political
colour of governments (Hibbs 1977), or the party preference of central bankers (Vaubel 1997)
2 might have
a significant impact on the conduct of monetary policy. Waller (1991) presents a ‘theory of optimal central
bank bashing’: by establishing a reputation for bashing, the government may be able to obtain its desired
policy outcome in the future. Therefore, monetary policy may be the result of a combination of interre-
lated economic and political factors, defined as follows:
•   Economic situation, characterised by a certain GDP growth, inflation rate etc. Traditional macroeco-
nomics assumes a mapping of each economic situation into an ‘optimal’ monetary policy. Such map-
ping is for example reflected in the Taylor rule (Taylor 1992).
•   Non-economic factors: central banks do not operate in a political vacuum. The public choice litera-
ture focuses on the impact of external pressure and public support. We define these factors as:
•   External pressure: Politicians and interest groups seek to influence the central bank’s decisions by
demanding higher or lower interest rates. External pressure on central banks is applied when the
government or interest groups demand changes in its current monetary policy stance. Negative
pressure indicates calls for lower interest rates, positive pressure calls for higher interest rates.
•   Public support: Behaviour where monetary authorities are supported, irrespective of the current
policy stance (Maier and Knaap 2002). Reading the newspapers, supportive statements can be
found quite frequently. For positive support they typically read as follows: “‘Don’t force the cen-
tral bank to do anything, they know better how to conduct monetary policy. Trust them, they will
do the right thing.”
3 Any sector of the population can offer public support. One reason for support
could be confidence in the central bank. External pressure and public support may be related; sup-
port becomes increasingly important, the higher is external pressure.
We mainly focus on pressure on and support for the monetary policy of the European Central Bank. How-
ever, due to the short sample period (the ECB only started to operate in 1999), we have also studied the
German Bundesbank, often called a ‘role model’ for the ECB. Bundesbank data allow us to draw addi-
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3 Negative support is then expression of a general mistrust of the central bank, i.e. ‘The central bank hardly knows how to conduct
monetary policy.”4
tional implications where the short sample period for ECB data is a limiting factor. However, there is also
a second reason why the Bundesbank offers interesting insight. Although the institutional setting of both
central banks differs (the Bundesbank was a national central bank, whereas the ECB is a supra-national
institution), for a number of results (e.g. the sources of pressure) it is illustrative to check whether the
Bundesbank and the ECB were similarly exposed.
Both central banks are characterised by a high degree of statutory independence (De Haan 1997). On the
one hand, this may protect European monetary policy from external pressure or prevent external pressure
to be effective (i.e. to have a significant impact on the conduct of monetary policy). On the other hand,
this does not imply that external pressure is not exerted. Piga (2001) argues that the degree of external
pressure can be related to the degree of ‘conservativeness’ (i.e. the preference for low inflation) of the
central banker. In his view, the Governing Council of the ECB “…is more akin to the conservative central
banker than to a board representing the interest of several constituencies. … While it may be that these
rules will discourage interest groups from [applying external pressure], it may also be that these groups
will press even harder to get their desired policies implemented…” (Piga, 2001, p. 75).
3  Measuring 'Pressure' and 'Support'
Measuring external pressure and public support is not straightforward, as in particular pressure is fre-
quently not directly observable. In the public choice literature several variables are used to proxy external
pressure. For instance, it is commonly assumed that elections have a significant impact on the conduct of
monetary policy (Nordhaus 1975), as politicians want to be re-elected and therefore have an incentive to
stimulate the economy before elections. Still, attempts to establish empirically the importance of elections
have delivered mixed results, to say the least (Berger et al. 2001). The approach pioneered by Havrilesky
(1993) offers a refinement. He constructs an indicator for political pressure on the US Federal Reserve,
based on the number of newspaper reports in which politicians argue in favour of a more or less restrictive
monetary policy.
4 The main idea is as follows: if conflicts between (pressure) groups and the central bank
occur or if external pressure is applied, this will be reflected by press coverage.
5 More severe struggles
result in more articles. To construct the indicator, the number of articles in leading newspapers, in which a
change in monetary policy was demanded, are counted as either +1 (demand for higher interest rates) or –
1 (demand for lower interest rates). The external pressure index consists of the simple, unweighted sum of
                                                     
4 In regressions for the Federal Funds rate this indicator is highly significant (Havrilesky 1993, Froyen et al. 1997).
5 This is not to say that all conflicts are reported immediately, but “[all information] that is of value to market participants will
systematically appear in the financial press. Specifically, we assume that the policy content of formal and informal communica-
tions from the Administration to the Federal Reserve… is reliably and consistently reported in the press” (Havrilesky 1993, p. 40).5
pluses and minuses. We use indicators for external pressure and public support for both the European
Central Bank and the Bundesbank, based on those newspapers:
6
•   The ECB data set was build using the “Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung”, the “Handelsblatt”, “Het
Financieele Dagblad”, the “NRC Handelsblad￿, “Financial Times” and the “Wall Street Journal”.
7
•   Bundesbank indices are based on the “Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung”, “Handelsblatt” and “Die
Welt”.
8
We concentrated on articles about interest rates (see appendix for more information). Reports calling for
monetary ease were counted as -1 (negative pressure) and reports in favour of more restrictive monetary
policy as +1 (positive pressure). In addition, articles voicing discontent with the ECB's interest rate policy
were classified as –1 (negative support) and articles expressing support as +1 (positive support). We use
the unweighted sum of the articles to construct the indicators.
For each article, we identified the sector that voiced the demand (support), and for the ECB the country in
which pressure (support) occurred. As sectors, we included national government(s), banks,
9 the industry,
trade unions and other sources – both statements from international organisations such as the IMF and
pressure from governments outside the euro area (mainly the US), as well as academic viewpoints.
10 The
indicators have the following desirable properties: first, they do not focus only on specific periods (such as
elections), but on the relationship between the central bank and organised groups at any time. Second, they
not only show the different origins of pressure and support (i.e. the interest groups), but also the strength
                                                     
6 Our selection of newspapers is based on the idea that we want to have independent and politically neutral newspapers that cover
economic affairs extensively. Furthermore, the circulation should be as broad as possible, as the broader the circulation, the higher
the effect on public opinion and (presumably) also on European monetary policy.
7 The latter are included for their widespread circulation in business and finance circles, but also as a robustness check to verify
that conflicts are consistently reported in all newspapers. We could not get hold of newspapers from each euro area country, but a
number of cross-checks have been done and have shown that most news was consistently reported in all newspapers. This indi-
cates that the benefit of including additional newspapers is likely to be small. For the ECB data this holds all the more since Hayo
(1998) has shown that German and Dutch inflation aversion were quite similar, but during the period considered German and
Dutch inflation rates were not. Still, the fact that only national newspapers have been used for the Bundesbank, whereas also
“non-euro area” newspapers were used for the ECB, and the increased number of newspapers for the ECB limit the possibility for
direct comparisons. We therefore do not compare absolute values of observations, but shares (e.g. the number of articles from
trade unions relative to the total number of observations, instead of the absolute number of articles from trade unions).
8 The Bundesbank data set has been used previously in Maier et al. (2002) and in Maier and Knaap (2002).
9 Posen (1993) first mentioned the importance of financial sector interests for monetary policy.
10 In some cases pressure from unspecified sources are mentioned, e.g. "The ECB is asked to lower the interest rates" or "The
demand for monetary ease becomes more frequent", which we also counted as "Other sources".6
(as indicated by the number of articles). This indicates the magnitude of a conflict. The ECB indices run
from 1/1999 to 2/2002 (weekly data), the Bundesbank index from 1/1960 to 12/1998 (monthly data).
We generally believe that this approach should give a reliable picture of the attempts to influence Euro-
pean monetary policy from outside. Nevertheless, potential drawbacks with the approach should also be
pointed out: first, a conflict will most probably be covered more extensively during the “dull season”
(limited other news available) than during a hectic period. Furthermore, it is assumed that two articles
measuring pressure indicate twice as much pressure than one article, which may, but need not, be correct.
4  Sources of pressure and support
In what follows we examine the sources of pressure and support for two central banks: first, the Deutsche
Bundesbank as an example of a national central bank; second the ECB as an example of a supra-national
central bank. We use the German data to derive conclusions about the de-facto position of the Bundesbank
in the public arena. These results can be regarded as a prior for the analysis of the ECB. Then, we check
whether these priors are confirmed for the ECB, or to what extent (structural) differences exist in the pub-
lic position of the supra-national ECB.
4.1  The Deutsche Bundesbank
Figure 1 displays the indicators for pressure and support on the left axis and the German short-term inter-
est rate (day-to-day rate) on the right axis. Both indicators are shown at the most aggregated level, i.e.
‘total pressure’ and ‘total support’. Pressure has been negative on average, which implies that calls to
lower interest rates were more frequent than attempts to convince the Bundesbank to increase interest
rates.
11 However, there were periods when calls for higher interest rates (i.e. positive pressure) were
strong. These were typically periods of relatively high inflation, e.g. in the early 1970s when the Bretton
Woods system restricted the Bundesbank’s ability to increase interest rates. Visual inspection suggests a
negative correlation between pressure and support, i.e. the higher external pressure to lower interest rates,
the higher public support.
This is confirmed in Table 1, where we report the correlation between pressure, support and the absolute
values of pressure and support and some key economic variables over the entire sample. Additional re-
search shows that the causality between pressure and support runs one way, i.e. high external pressure
causes public support (Maier and Knaap 2002). This is what we expect: if external pressure mounts, pub-
                                                     
11 This can also be seen in Table 1, where the correlation between ABS(Pressure) and Pressure is -0.6 – this implies that on aver-
age 60% of the newspaper articles classified as pressure were calling for lower interest rates.7
lic support increases as some people realise that some sectors try to force the central bank to adopt a dif-
ferent policy stance. Note also that the correlation between pressure and interest rates is negative, whereas
interest rates and support are positively correlated. This implies that high interest rates lead to negative
pressure (i.e. demands for lower interest rates) and positive support.




















Pressure from all sectors Support from all sectors Short-term interest rate (right-scale)
Table 1: Correlations for the Bundesbank (monthly data)
Abs(Pressure) Pressure Support Interest rate
Abs(Pressure) 1.00
Pressure -0.60 1.00
Support 0.47 -0.40 1.00
Interest rate 0.18 -0.21 0.19 1.00
Inflation 0.12 -0.10 0.16 0.60
Unemployment 0.14 -0.17 0.17 0.20
Unemployment and inflation is also negatively correlated with pressure and positively with support – the
main reason here is that unemployment and high inflation typically occur at the same time (the correlation
between inflation and unemployment in Germany during our sample is 0.39). Table 1 postulate that high
interest rates, high inflation or high unemployment are all correlated with pressure to lower interest rates.8
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To analyse the sources of pressure and support we plot the absolute values of both indicators per sector
(see Figure 2 and 3). We see that on average the distribution of pressure and support has been rather stable
with the government and the banks (i.e. the financial sector) accounting for the bulk of the evidence. In
Fout! Ongeldige bladwijzerverwijzing. we show the relative importance of the different interest groups,
i.e. the number of statements of a certain group relative to the total number of articles. For example, the
number of articles related to trade unions and employers’ organisation amount to 15% and 12%, respec-
tively. Since the early 1980s ‘other sources’ (in particular the EU Commission and the IMF) also at-
tempted to influence the Bundesbank. The impact of these international institutions is particularly evident9
in the early 1990s, when high German interest rates ultimately led to the collapse of the European Mone-
tary System in 1992 (see Figure 2).
Regarding the sources of support, it is interesting to note that the German government frequently sup-
ported the Bundesbank (in fact it supported the Bundesbank’s policy more often than it attempted to influ-
ence it). Again, we note the relatively strong influence of various interest groups. Reading the newspapers
it is interesting to see that different members of the same interest group are often far from being homoge-
neous in their desires regarding monetary policy.
12
Table 2: Percentage of newspaper evidence from each interest group
Deutsche Bundesbank European Central Bank
Pressure Support Pressure Support
Government 18.5% 31.3% 39.2% 9.0%
Banks 30.5% 39.5% 12.5% 32.8%
Industry 12% 21% 4.2% 0.0%
Trade Unions 15% 3.2% 2.5% 0.0%
Other sources 24% 5% 41.7% 58.2%
To summarise, from the German data the following priors can be drawn: first, the high degree of statutory
independence of the Bundesbank did not avoid frequent attempts from interest groups or governments to
apply pressure for lower or higher interest rates. This implies that a high degree of legal independence
itself says relatively little about the de-facto position of a central bank – only if it resists external pressure,
its monetary policy can truly be classified as independent. Second, attempts to influence German mone-
tary policy came from all major German interest groups. Third, the government played a strong role, both
in exercising pressure and in supporting its central bank.
4.2  The European Central Bank
In Figure 4 we plot the most aggregated pressure and support indicator for European monetary policy.
These indicators include pressure and support from all interest groups and newspapers in all countries. We
identify two spikes in terms of external pressure, in the second quarter 2001 and in the fourth quarter of
2001, and one spike in public support (second quarter of 2001).
                                                     
12 For instance, in the sector ‘Industry’ domestic-oriented employers care more about stable domestic prices, whereas export-
oriented employers care more about favourable exchange rates (Maier et al. 2002).10
External pressure was on average negative; i.e. pressure was primarily directed towards interest rate re-
ductions. Unlike the Bundesbank data, we have made a distinction between positive and negative support
for the ECB: positive support indicates that people express an overall satisfaction with the ECB and do not
want other to influence it, whereas negative support indicates an overall dissatisfaction with the ECB’s
conduct of monetary policy (see appendix). We see that support was negative in most cases, indicating
that overall European monetary policy was not well-received. The correlation between pressure, support
and the absolute values of pressure and support over the entire sample for the ECB is reported in Table 3.
The correlation between Pressure and ABS(Pressure) is strongly negative, illustrating that most newspaper
articles were calling for monetary ease. The correlation between interest rates and pressure is relatively
low, but the sign is as in the German case: high interest rates lead to negative pressure, that is, external
pressure is applied to reduce interest rates. Also the correlation between (absolute) pressure and (absolute)
support on the one hand, and unemployment and inflation on the other have the same sign and are of
roughly similar magnitudes as in the German case.
13 This suggests that economic conditions have compa-
rable effects on the external position of both central banks. Finally, note the negative correlation between
support and ABS(support): overall, people were less inclined to support the ECB than to express a general
dissatisfaction. This illustrates the criticism the ECB has received.














repo-rate (left-scale) Pressure from all countries, all sectors Support from all countries, all sectors
Notable differences with the German case arise when the sources of pressure and support are analysed.
We plot the absolute values of both indicators for the ECB per sector in Figure 5 and Figure 6. We see that
                                                     
13 All coefficients are somewhat higher in Table 3 than in Table 1, this is due to the shorter sample period (less economic fluctua-
tions). Detailed econometrics tests could not be run, due to the short sample period.11
in particular political pressure has increased in 2001, although pressure by “others” also increased in the
second quarter of 2001. Unlike the German case support from governments is largely missing for the
ECB. Moreover, interest groups, in particular trade unions and employers (the latter counted as “Indus-
try”), hardly play a role. Concerning public support, employers’ organisations and trade unions did not
support the ECB at all, whereas banks were relatively outspoken (they account for the bulk of the negative
support evidence, in particular in 2001).
Table 3: Correlations for the ECB (weekly data)
Abs(Pressure) Pressure Abs(Support) Support Interest rate
ABS(Pressure) 1.00
Pressure -0.99 1.00
ABS(Support) 0.70 -0.70 1.00
Support 0.50 -0.49 0.06 1.00
Interest rate 0.32 -0.30 0.42 0.27 1.00
Inflation
a 0.42 -0.42 0.67 0.02 0.70
Unemployment
a 0.27 -0.29 0.07 -0.05 -0.26
a Monthly data
This contrasts with our results for the Bundesbank, where interest groups, in particular commercial banks,
frequently attempted to influence German monetary policy. How can this be explained? From a public
choice perspective, the discretion of national policymakers is sharply reduced in a monetary union, as
responsibility for monetary policy is shifted to the European level. Therefore, the balance between poli-
cymakers and national interest groups in member countries changes significantly: national policymakers
have less to “offer” to interest groups. Interest groups realise that monetary policy decisions are now based
on the euro area aggregate. This limits the scope for national interest groups to influence European mone-
tary policy. From a theoretical perspective, this development can only be welcomed. The entire idea of
making central banks independent is based on the notion that monetary policy should be protected from
short-run considerations or individual or group-specific rent-seeking. Fewer attempts to influence the ECB
can only result in a monetary policy that concentrates more on economic fundamentals.
Next, we look briefly at the results for four countries covered relatively extensively in our newspaper
sample: Germany, the Netherlands, France and Belgium. The idea here is to identify which countries are
most likely to exert political pressure, given the hypothesis that the interest rate set by the single monetary
policy need not be optimal for all countries. Based on the national economic situation, some politicians
might prefer higher or lower interest rates. Note also that to some extent, the reaction might be asymmet-
ric, i.e. pressure to lower interest rates is voiced more quickly than demands to raise interest rates.12
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A popular measure to determine ex-post whether monetary policy was ‘economically optimal’ is the Tay-
lor rule (Taylor 1992). We have estimated Taylor-rules for Germany, the Netherlands, France and Bel-
gium to evaluate when and whether they might have preferred higher or lower interest rates.
14 In Table 4
we report (a) the ‘optimal’ interest rate per country, as suggested by the Taylor-rule, (b) the ‘de-facto’
interest rate set by the ECB and (c) the difference between the optimal and the de-facto interest rate.
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Table 4: Taylor-rules
1999 2000 2001
Taylor-rule De facto Difference Taylor-rule De facto Difference Taylor-rule De facto Difference
Belgium 2.8 3.3 0.6 6.0 4.9 - 1.1 5.0 3.3 - 1.7
France 2.1 3.3 1.3 4.6 4.9 0.3 4.5 3.3 -  1.2
Germany 1.7 3.3 1.7 4.6 4.9 0.3 4.4 3.3 -  1.1
Netherlands 5.4 3.3 - 2.1 6.0 4.9 - 1.1 9.2 3.3 - 5.9







Q1/1999 Q2/1999 Q3/1999 Q4/1999 Q12000 Q2/2000 Q3/2000 Q4/2000 Q1/2001 Q2/2001 Q3/2001 Q4/2001 Q1/2002
Germany France Belgium Netherlands
For all these countries the de facto interest rate was too low in 2001, while the results were more mixed in
2000 and 1999. In 1999 for example, France, Belgium and Germany would have been better off with a
lower interest rate, while the Netherlands would have preferred a higher interest rate given its economic
constellation. Therefore, we would expect pressure to lower interest rates from Germany, Belgium or
France, and to raise interest rates from the Netherlands. In line with this expectation, the external pressure
indicator points (mildly) to some downward pressure stemming from Germany and some upward pressure
stemming from the Netherlands in 1999 (Figure 7). When external pressure to lower interest rates in-
creased in 2001, the Taylor-rules indicate that the de facto interest rate was too low for all countries. This
indicates that pressure may indeed be voiced in an asymmetric manner. An interesting result is that the
only countries that at certain points in time pressured (mildly) for an interest rate increase were the Neth-
erlands and Germany. However, Dutch demands for higher interest rates occurred before Dutch inflation14
started to diverge upwards from the euro area average, and high Dutch inflation in 2000 and 2001 has not
led to further Dutch pressure to increase interest rates. This can be interpreted as a good sign: apparently,
the Dutch realised that if monetary policy became more restrictive due to (short-term) Dutch interests, this
might be detrimental for the euro area as a whole. Besides, as the Dutch economy is very open, feedback
effects might also have affected the Netherlands negatively in the medium term.
5  What causes external pressure?
Finally, we formally explore the underlying causes for external pressure. Estimates for the ECB are not
reliable due to the short sample period, but we are able to run regressions for the Bundesbank. This may
further clarify the influence of economic variables on the attempts to influence central banks externally,
which is a relationship likely to hold not only in Germany, but also for Europe as a whole. Our hypothesis
is that pressure on a central bank increases as inflation or unemployment rises. Moreover, we have in-
cluded an additional potential source for external pressure: if the hypothesis is true that governments care
about being re-elected, we might expect that pressure increases if the current government is doing badly in
opinion polls. We start by estimating the following model (monthly data):
, t ii t i t i i t i t l Opinionpol nt Unemployme Inflation Pressure ε γ β α  + + + = − −
where  Pressuret is the aggregated German pressure index, Unemploymentt denotes the year-on-year
changes in the unemployment rate, Inflationt is the annual growth of consumer prices and εt is an inde-
pendent and identically distributed disturbance term. Opinionpollt is a dummy variable, equalling +1 if
opinion polls indicate that current government may be loosing their majority in Parliament (i.e. the current
coalition government gets less than 50 per cent of the votes in the latest opinion poll), equalling +2 if the
coalition government is behind in the polls less than 6 months prior to elections and 0 otherwise (see ap-
pendix for details). In other words, the dummy variable measures the incentives for governments to put
pressure on the central bank if opinion polls show that its re-election might be in danger – particularly so
if election date approaches.
 15
Imposing common lag lengths has no basis in theory and may lead to misleading inferences concerning
causality.
16 To overcome this problem Hsiao (1981) suggested using Akaike’s Final Prediction Error crite-
rion (Akaike 1969, 1970) to determine the lag structure. Therefore we use the FPE criterion to select the
                                                     
15 Different specifications of the Opinionpoll variable have been tested, and delivered qualitatively similar results. Robustness
tests included the DM/Dollar exchange rate to capture the idea that employers’ organisations might react to an appreciating cur-
rency, but this variable remained insignificant.
16 See Ahking and Miller (1985) and Thornton and Batten (1985).15
appropriate number of lags i for each independent variable.
17 The results for this specification are reported
in Table 5. The relatively poor fit of the regression can be explained by a missing lag of the dependent
variable. The results indicate that high unemployment growth indeed leads to pressure to lower interest
rates. The inflation variable is negative: as explained previously, economic crises were frequently charac-
terised by a combination of rising inflation and unemployment. Most interesting is the fact that the data
from opinion polls is significant and has the right sign, i.e. if a government’s majority in Parliament is
endangered, pressure to lower interest rates is applied.
18
Table 5: Dependent variable: Total pressure on the Bundesbank






Unemployment 1 -0.43*** 8.94***
Opinionpoll 1 -0.16 -2.25*
Adjusted R-squared 0.15 AIC 3.42
S.E. of regression 1.32 DW statistic 1.81
Sum squared resid 293.02 S.D. dependent var 1.44
Log likelihood -291.06 Schwarz criterion 3.51
a Numer of lags included according to the FPE-criterion
b Sum of the estimated coefficients: neutrality tests
c F-statistic testing whether each of the estimated coefficient equals zero: Granger causality test
What do these results for the Bundesbank bank imply for the European Central Bank? We might expect
that pressure from governments on the ECB increases if certain governments are doing badly in opinion
polls. This could coincide with an overall increase in political pressure, simply because the number of
governments involved is higher than for any national central bank.
To what extent will external pressure influence the actual conduct of European monetary policy? Based on
the institutional setting and the Bundesbank’s experience, we expect the following: first, there are no signs
that the Bundesbank altered its policy significantly in the face of political pressure (Maier et al. 2002).
                                                     
17 If necessary, variables have been de-trended to ensure stationarity. A Ramsey RESET test did not indicate parameter instability.
18 Opinionpollt is in fact significant at the 5% level. We have also tested for asymmetric effects, i.e. the possibility that the mo-
tives to rise interest rates differ from those leading to interest rate reductions. Here the results are far from being robust. There-
fore, we have decided not to report them.16
Second, there is one major difference with respect to the institutional setting: to some extent the Bundes-
bank was more ‘vulnerable’ with regard to political pressure than the ECB is, because as a national central
bank it was accountable to one, national government. Although the constitutional hurdles were high, the
German government ultimately had the power to change the Bundesbank law, thereby reducing its inde-
pendence. So the Bundesbank faced a real, albeit small, possibility that the political rhetoric might become
a serious threat. The ECB’s statutory position is different: it is more likely to face political pressure from
different governments, but none can ultimately influence its monetary policy. This is because any change
to the ECB’s legal status requires unanimous consent of all EMU member states. Clearly, such a consen-
sus is not likely because the re-election changes of one government are in danger. Only if all EMU gov-
ernments agreed to change the Maastricht Treaty, the ECB’s legal position is threatened. We do not regard
such a scenario as very likely. As a result, we think it is highly unlikely that the ECB will ever give in to
external pressure, in particular not to external pressure resulting from elections in certain member states.
6  Conclusion
Much literature is devoted to the possibility that central banks might give in to external pressure, but apart
from a number of hypotheses, the source of external pressure has remained unclear. In this paper, we have
examined political pressure on two central banks: a national one, the Bundesbank, and the supra-national
European Central Bank. Using newspaper evidence we were able to show that interest groups are more
inclined to influence the national Bundesbank than the supra-national ECB. Given the limited impact of
national interest groups within Europe, this finding does not come as a surprise. This also explains why
the overall degree of pressure on the ECB was relatively low, compared to the Bundesbank – and shows
that the hypothesis by (Piga 2001) does not hold. For some countries we also estimated Taylor-rules and
analysed the extent to which deviations from an optimal monetary policy, tailored to the specific needs of
a country, leads to pressure from that country. Here the conclusions are relatively simple: external pres-
sure on the ECB need not come from countries that experience a deviation from the Taylor rule.
Lastly, we have used Bundesbank data to relate external pressure to economic and political variables. This
analysis has shown that pressure on a national central bank is likely to mount if unemployment is rising or
the government performs badly in opinion polls. This last factor, which to a large extent has dominated the
literature on political business cycles so far, has lost most of this threat for the supra-national ECB: in our
view, it is highly unlikely that the ECB will give in to pressure stemming from a particular country, sim-
ply because its degree of statutory independence is unprecedented – and no member country has the
means to force the ECB to adopt a certain policy stance, as this was the case prior to EMU.17
In the introduction we asked when, why and by whom central banks are bashed. Based on our findings, we
can answer this questions as follows: national central banks are likely to be bashed not only by politicians
and international organisations, but also by (national) interest groups. The supra-national ECB, however,
does not need to fear the latter. Econometrically, Bundesbank bashing occurred when unemployment was
rising or when a government risked losing upcoming elections. To what extent these factors also apply for
the ECB remains to be seen.
Appendix: Data sources
The newspaper indicators
The data sets were build by screening all articles related to the Bundesbank or the ECB. For each article
the main actors, the main statements and the date of appearance was noted. It is important to stress that in
the index, we have only included articles with ‘policy implications’, i.e. articles that call for lower or
higher interest rates. Articles expressing a general frustration about monetary policy strategy (i.e. the
ECB’s two pillar-approach) without direct implications for interest rate decisions are not included in the
index. In addition, discontent with the euro exchange rate was not included, since this discomfort did not
translate into a preference for higher or lower interest rates. Therefore, the index mirrors external requests
to change interest rates, but not the ‘general opinion’ about monetary policy in Germany or the euro area.
Articles demanding a more restrictive monetary policy were counted as +1 (positive pressure), each article
calling for monetary ease was counted as –1 (negative pressure). The news indicator for each category
consists of the simple, unweighted sum of pluses and minuses. This closely follows Havrilesky's meth-
odological approach. If an approval statement contains also a demand for further policy measures (“we are
glad interest rates were lowered, but this was only a first step and further policy measures are necessary”),
then such a statement was classified as pressure. For the “support index” we counted all articles express-
ing approval of current monetary policy as +1 (positive support) and disapproval as –1 (negative support).
Note that the support series are not fully comparable: as at the time the Bundesbank support series were
build, the need for ‘negative support’ was not evident from the newspaper articles. Therefore, for the Bun-
desbank only positive support was counted. For the ECB, however, negative support was clearly visible,
so we accounted for the possibility that the public expresses a general ‘unhappiness’ about the ECB.
For the Bundesbank, the articles were classified according to the sectors government, banks, industry,
trade unions and others. We used the same categories for the ECB, but additionally grouped the articles
per country. The total number of articles exceed more than 400 and 200 for the pressure and support indi-
ces for the Bundesbank and more than 100 and 60 for the ECB pressure and support indices, respectively.18
Other data
The opinion poll data used in section 5 was provided from the Zentralarchiv f￿r empirische Sozialfor-
schung and is based on publications from the German Allensbach Institut. They are widely perceived as
good indicator for the political mood. The percentage of the population voting the incumbent government
if elections were held ‘next Sunday’ has been used to construct the Opinionpollt dummy variable: this
variable equals +1 if the current government would get less than 50% of the votes in an election and +2 if
elections are actually held in less than 6 months. For the short-term interest rate day-to-day rates have
been used. All variables have been de-trended if necessary to ensure stationarity.
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